Soccer Defending Tactics
Soccer defending is all about stopping your opponents from scoring. If you let your opponents score then you will usually hear how poor you are in defense (even if you run out of breath, training to stop your opponent from scoring).
But as you will notice, on the soccer field you need also to communicate with your teammates telling them how to cover up free areas and how to act in defense. In this article we will take a look at some of the most common tactics used in soccer defense. Let’s start
Using Zonal Marking in your defense
Zonal defense is pretty easy to understand. Every midfielder and defender is given a particular zone on the field to cover. It is crucial that each one of your teammates fulfills their duties with 100 % concentration.
Your main duty when playing in a zonal marking formation is to cover your area. But, if you see that one of your teammates needs assistance you should of course try to help him/her even if it means leaving your zone.
Your opponents will be facing two lines with four players each that will cover the entirety of half of the soccer field. The defensive line need to communicate and coordinate the movement of your other teammates.
As I mentioned before, zonal defending is pretty simple but you and your teammates need to really work and communicate to accomplish this tactic successfully. If any of you fails to cover his/her area of the field the opponents will have a free road to the goal.
Man to Man marking
This soccer defending tactic is often associated with continental and especially Italian way of playing soccer. Man to man marking simply means that all your teammates are responsible for keeping an eye on a particular opponent. This tactic is most effective alongside a sweeper who has a free role on the field.
As a sweeper you will be able to support any teammate that needs assistance with his/her opponent. You will also reduce the potency of through pass and long balls played over the top of your defense.
However, to accomplish this tactic successfully you and your teammates will need to have great discipline in the role as marker. Your team also need to pay attention to which of your opponents are fast and choose a fast running teammate to mark him/her.
Friday, March 25, 2011
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Tactics 101 - Game tactics
Tactics during a game situation
General principles of attack and defence
Width and depth are both principles of offence and defence as follows:
- Width in attack- the attacker tries to stretch the enemy by maximizing width and space
- Width in defence- the defender tries to contract and deny width and space
- Depth in attack- the attacker uses depth by moving men up from the rear, but may use a constant "target striker" or front man to always be present deep in the defence.
- Depth in defence- the defender also uses depth by providing covering support for a teammate, but may abandon depth temporarily to set an offside trap.
- Balance in defence. The defence attempts balanced coverage of vulnerable space. Players do not simply cluster on the right side for example, just because the ball is there at the moment.
Offensive tactics: attacking
- 'Pass and move': This is the most basic team tactic — as soon as the ball has come into possession of the player, they need to be quick to decide whether to pass it or not. If they don't pass it immediately, they need to move with it; if they do pass it, they again need to move along, following the general ball movement.
This can also be used to mean that once a player has passed the ball he does not remain stationary but moves into a position where he can receive the ball again and give more options to the player in possession.
- 'Give and go'[or 'combination passing']: This is a basic tactic which is essentially the same as 'pass and move', and is an essential part of the 'target man' style of play (see below). The player in possession of the ball plays a pass to a teammate and then immediately seeks to move into space. If the player who passed the ball can 'lose' his defensive marker (either through pace, movement, superior fitness or a lack of awareness on the part of the defender) he could then be free to receive a return pass and advance towards and possibly threaten the goal. When the ball is played by the receiving player immediately back to the first player this is known as a 'One-Two' (in British parlance)
- Switching the attack: Using a 'square' or 'cross' pass across the whole width of the pitch to a player in plenty of space is a very effective way of both relieving pressure and building a fresh attack. The defending team will be required to adjust its positions and this usually creates spaces which can be exploited. In this example, the player numbered 1 has moved out of position, allowing more space for the opposing player. By playing the ball to the other side (the curved line represents an aerial pass), the recipient of the pass finds themselves in space which can be exploited.
- The 'through ball': Using the space behind the opponent's defensive line: Passes into this area have a number of pros: If an attacking player reaches the pass, taking care to avoid offside, he may get a 1-on-1 challenge with the goalkeeper, or be in an excellent position for a flank attack. Even if a defender reaches the pass first, the outcome could still be good for the attacking team. The defender will face his own goal, which could prompt him to give away a corner kick or a throw-in, make a risky pass to his team's goalkeeper, or being put under heavy pressure near the corner flag. Typically, teams with faster attackers than the opponent's defenders will try challenging this space, while the defending team in these cases will want to keep their defenders low when defending in order to give away as little space as possible between the defenders and the goalkeeper.
- The long through ball: This is a long, and usually high, pass from a teams' own half, over the heads of the other team's defence. It is intended for the attacking players to chase and it is important that they remain in an onside position until the ball is kicked. The tactic works best with strong and fast forwards who will have a good chance of winning back the ball, taking control over it, and eventually getting a shot on goal. In the diagram, the ball (red line) is played in front of the furthermost forward, the dotted blue line showing their run. In this example, a through-ball pass along the ground would be picked up by one of the defenders (black team) because the gap between the two central defenders is too small.
- Using the space between the opponent's defensive line and midfielder line ('the hole'): A common build-up of attacks is to pass the ball into the space between the opponent's defenders and midfielders. Normally, an attacker with his back to the goal will receive the pass. He will seek to turn with the ball, or distribute it to a player facing the goal, who optimally also is in front of the opponent's midfielders - or even on the move into the space behind the opponent's defenders.
- Triangular movement: This is a movement tactic that allows a safe and quick shifting of the offensive flanks while maintaining control of the ball. In a triangular play the ball is passed between three players to form a triangle. The triangle is then shifted to a different position when a new player is added. Many triangles can be created with various combinations of players with the intention of slowly moving the ball forward and never really compromising possession. This tactic works well when trying to gain control in the midfield. However, it can also be used for pure attacking purposes. The effectiveness of this tactic lies in the fact that defenders are unable to quickly 'adapt' to the other attacker's style of play.
- Swapping of the wing men: Sometimes, a team with two flexible (position wise) wide men will allow them to interchange as the game progresses. The aim of this is to confuse the defenders who are assigned to mark them, thus maybe leading to opportunities as the defender tries to find their man in set pieces (corners, free kicks etc., where the man may be in a totally different position and thus evade his grasp). Also, if the wingers are different types of player (one favouring crossing from deep positions whilst the other is prone to trying to dribble past their marker for example), then it might be to exploit a weakness in the opposing defender.
- Strong Side Overloads: An offensive attack can pressure the defense on to one side of the pitch by running most of its attackers and midfielders to one side letting a wing player or defender come to the opposite side with little or no coverage. The ball is then crossed or passed to that unmarked player for a free or near free shot.
- Using a target man: This tactic is useful when the team possesses a quality striker who has the ability of taking on the whole defence on his own. He will usually occupy two defenders, thus making the defence more vulnerable. Combined with two fast wingers, this tactic may give the 4-man defence potential problems. The team may also benefit from a target man at set pieces. The target man, can use give/go tactics described earlier, can attempt to "knock down" high passes to teammates or can simply try to outpower and outmuscle opposition defenders to create scoring opportunities for himself. Alan Shearer, Duncan Ferguson, Chris Sutton, Emmanuel Adebayor, Luca Toni, Emile Heskey, Jan Koller,Nikola Žigić, Zlatan Ibrahimovic, Peter Crouch, Didier Drogba and Miroslav Klose are all examples of strikers adept at playing this role.
How Mainz Stopped Bayern- Zonal Marking
How Mainz stopped Bayern – in ten steps
Lewis Holtby, the young Mainz central midfielder
Mainz are THE story of the European season so far – top of the Bundesliga with six wins from six.
Five wins from five was good enough, but few expected the run to continue, since they faced a trip to last season’s champions. But Mainz triumphed 2-1 over Bayern, using a 4-3-1-2 formation and pressing all over the pitch.
For background information on Mainz’s start to the season,Raphael Honigstein (as ever) has a most interesting report, in a piece written before the Bayern game, focussing largely on Thomas Tuchel, Mainz’s manager.
Honigstein’s piece following this game also featured quotes from Adam Szalai on his side’s tactical approach to this game. “Our mission was to put on pressure and to destroy their passing into the centre…we wanted to force them to play it via the full-backs. When the ball was out wide, one of our holding midfielders moved out. That worked well.”
Here are ten ways they managed to stop Bayern.
The basic shape
Tuchel is a tactical chameleon, having played three separate systems in his six matches so far this season - 4-2-3-1, 4-3-2-1, and 4-3-1-2. Here, he favoured the latter, with a flat back four (light blue) behind three central midfielders (dark blue). Ahead of them was Holtby, a central attacking midfielder who got through a lot of defensive work (yellow). The two strikers are off screen to the right. It is also notable that Bayern's 4-4-2 (rather than their usual 4-2-3-1) gives them no central playmaker, just two strikers upfront waiting for service.
Holtby running…
The main factor in Mainz's approach was heavy pressing all over the pitch. Holtby was a key factor in this, tirelessly closing down Mark van Bommel and Bastian Schweinsteiger early on. As noted in the Bayern reports from the games against Wolfsburg and Roma, Bayern are playing a more possession-based approach than last season, happy to retain the ball in non-threatening areas in the midfield. They weren't able to do that, because of Mainz's pressing.
…and tackling
Holtby's job was to run between van Bommel and Schweinsteiger, and try and stop them playing a forward pass. In the photo above, he was closing down van Bommel, here, he goes for Schweinsteiger.
Outside central midfielders
As Szalai says above, the strategy for dealing with the full-backs (a problem area when fielding a 4-3-1-2 against a four-man defence) was for one of the three central midfielders to come out to meet them. Here, veteran Miroslav Karhan closes down Danijel Pranjic, whilst the other two central midfielders remain as a double pivot ahead of the defence. This forced Bayern to play uncharacteristic quick crossfield balls, many of which were waywarn and went out of play.
Pressing from the front
The pressing started from the front - here the two strikers close down Daniel van Buyen and Holger Badstuber, so Bayern are unable to play out from the back.
Force Klose to come short
Eventually, Bayern became so frustrated at not being able to keep the ball in the centre of the pitch, that Miroslav Klose (pink) started dropping into a deep position, where he was clearly uncomfortable and struggled to help. Here he drops very deep, and one of the Mainz central midfielders tackles him.
Midfield barrier
For the second half Mainz switched to something more like a 4-4-2, but their midfield still stayed narrow, shuffled from side to side and broke up the passing in the midfield. Here, in the second half, they still retain three midfielders in the centre of the pitch, forming a barrier between the ball and the defence.
Striker drops back
This meant that the Holtby (who was removed at half-time having got through an incredible amount of running) role was no longer on the pitch, in theory giving van Bommel and Schweinsteiger more time on the ball. But Mainz' strikers dropped back to help out - here Sami Allagui (black), who spent the first half high up the pitch, comes back to pressure van Bommel.
Schweinsteiger drops in
Bayern eventually became so tired of their centre-backs being pressed from goal-kicks that Schweinsteiger had to drop in and become a Busquets-style centre-half, and distribute the ball from deep.
Continue to press
4-2-1-3 is the Future?
The Question: Is 4-2-1-3 the future?
Although little different from 4-2-3-1, it is significant if the central creator plays deeper, for a whole number of reasons
Evolution never stops. As the World Cup showed, 4‑2‑3‑1 has come to replace 4‑4‑2 as the universal default (18 of the 32 teams played some form of 4‑2‑3‑1 at some stage, with another three fielding a 4‑4‑2 that perhaps should have become 4‑2‑3‑1) so the system at the very highest level has already begun to mutate. Spain, by the end of the World Cup, had followed what Barcelona did at times last season, what Arsenal seemed to be reaching towards, and set up in a 4‑2‑1‑3.
Now clearly the distinction between 4‑2‑3‑1 and 4‑2‑1‑3 is minimal. It entails nothing more than the central player in the trident pulling a little deeper and the two wide players advancing slightly. In practice, as the wide players look to escape the attentions of full-backs, their depth of position may not alter greatly, but to refer to the system as 4‑2‑1‑2‑1 and start introducing a fifth band is probably to begin to confuse the simplicity that gives value to the practice of assigning numerical codes. The shape, if anything, resembles a diamond sitting on a plinth. As I've said before, the designations are of course crude, but they have a use in providing a broad explicatory template.
The key differences in the formations
Yet it is significant if that central creator plays deeper, for a whole number of reasons. To begin with, if the playmaker operates close to the holding pair, the team cannot be "broken" into attacking and defensive sections as Holland and Argentina were at the World Cup (which is an advantage for those sides that believe in a possession-based approach). By definition, by being only a short pass away from the creator, the two midfield holders are more involved in the attacking aspect and at least one of them can be encouraged to press forwards at times, as Xabi Alonso did for Spain, and as Seydou Keita does for Barcelona. So immediately the range of attacking options is increased.
There is also an impact on the creator himself. Playing a touch deeper offers him three advantages. He is nearer the two holding players, who can be considered his protectors, which makes it harder physically to intimidate him, while his more withdrawn position means he is farther from the opposing holding midfielders, harder to pick up and thus likely to have more time on the ball (not that Xavi or Cesc Fábregas really needs more time on the ball; one of the joys of watching Spain or Barcelona recently, or Holland or West Germany of the 70s, is their willingness to give the ball to a man under pressure, trusting his technique to release it and change the angle of attack).
The creator is also more likely to receive the ball facing goal – or at least to have time to turn so he is facing goal – with three team-mates ahead of him (as opposed to one ahead and two alongside) and the potential of others breaking from deep, and so he becomes something more like an old-fashioned playmaker than a second striker who tends to receive the ball with his back to goal. That, in theory, should make the transfer of ball from back to front quicker and thus make a side more penetrative (the example of Chile's 3‑3‑1‑3 at the World Cup suggested that leaving players perpetually high up the pitch helps in terms of pressing and regaining the ball quickly, but can lead to the retention of possession at the expense of penetration). As Juan Román Riquelme points out, a playmaker is only effective if he has players available for whom to make the play.
Which teams have adopted this tactic?
Just as significant, though, is the effect withdrawing the central creator has on the two wide forwards. Rather than having to stay wide to offer a passing option and so as not to intrude on the central player's space, they can drift infield, as Pedro and Andrés Iniesta did regularly for Spain, and as both and Lionel Messi do for Barcelona. That draws them away from the full-back into more awkward areas, and opens space on the overlap for attacking full-backs, who are liberated by the presence of four essentially defensive central players (two centre-backs and two holding midfielders), plus the creator, who can tuck in if necessary.
If Iniesta is included on the left, Messi on the right and Xavi in the middle, Barcelona effectively have a trident of playmakers, all able to interchange and all operating in positions that drag opponents out of their comfortable lines. Or, a more natural forward can be played in one of the wide positions – David Villa, perhaps, with Zlatan Ibrahimovic as the centre-forward – which offers effectively two playmakers (one of whom, Messi, is devastating as a forward anyway), with a central striker adept with his back to goal, and a forward, one of the best finishers in the world, cutting in from the left, able to take advantage of the space available on the diagonal. And all that with Dani Alves and Maxwell overlapping from full-back.
Although Arsenal seem likely to attempt something similar this season, with Fábregas in the Xavi role, backed up by Abou Diaby and Alex Song, Andrei Arshavin and Robin van Persie wide, and Marouane Chamakh offering some muscle at centre-forward, it may prove a formation of limited application, purely because the demands on the playmaker are so great: he must combine the ability to see and execute with at least some of the physicality of a central midfielder, even with two protectors. But when a team has a player like that, 4‑2‑1‑3 may be the way to get the best out of him.
Jonathan Wilson is guardian.co.uk's east European football correspondent. He also writes regularly for the Independent, the Independent on Sunday, FourFourTwo magazine and anybody else who waves money in his direction. He has written two books - Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football and Inverting the Pyramid, a book on football tactics.
Why Pressing is so crucial in Modern Game
The Question: Why is pressing so crucial in the modern game?
Barcelona and Bayern Munich both demonstrated the value of pressing the opposition to regain possession quickly last week
After Valeriy Lobanovskyi's Dynamo Kyiv had beaten Zenit Leningrad 3-0 in October 1981 to seal their 10th Soviet title, the report in Sportyvna Hazeta lamented that Viktor Maslov was not alive to see his conception of the game taken to such heights. It's a shame both weren't still with us to have seen those ideas taken to another level again by Barcelona againstArsenal last Wednesday.
As many have noted over the past week, Barcelona's rapid interchange of passes, the relentless attacking and the marauding full-backs perhaps recall one of the great Brazil sides, but the underlying process by which they play comes through the line of Maslov, Rinus Michels and Lobanovskyi.
"Without the ball," Pep Guardiola said after last season's Champions League final, "we are a disastrous team, a horrible team, so we need the ball." It is a sentence that could equally be used of Arsenal: of course they are much better in possession than out of it. The difference is that Barcelona are much better at regaining possession than Arsenal.
After 20 minutes last Wednesday, Barcelona had had 72% of the possession, a barely fathomable figure against anybody, never mind against a side so noted for their passing ability as Arsenal. Their domination in that area came not so much because they are better technically – although they probably are – but because they are better at pressing. In that opening spell, Barça snapped into tackles, swirled around Arsenal, pressured them even deep in their own half. It was a remorseless, bewildering assault; there was no respite anywhere on the pitch, not even when the ball was rolled by the goalkeeper to a full-back just outside the box.
Arsenal buckled. Again and again, even players for whom composure in possession is usually a default gave the ball away. It's hard to believe Cesc Fábregas, who was admittedly possibly hampered by injury, has ever passed the ball as poorly as he did in the first half. Andrey Arshavin was so discombobulated he did a mini-Gazza and crocked his knee lunging at Sergio Busquets.
The psychological factor
This is the unspoken strength of Barcelona: they aren't just majestic in possession themselves; they also make other sides tentative in possession. Think not just of Arsenal, but of Michael Carrick and Anderson haplessly misplacing passes in Rome last May. Partly that is because Barça are so quick to close space; but it is also psychological. Barça are so good in possession, so unlikely to give the ball back, that every moment when their opponents have the ball becomes unbearably precious; even simple passes become loaded with pressure because the consequences of misplacing them are so great.
Although less spectacular in possession, Dunga's Brazil do something similar, aided, as Rob Smyth noted, by having conned the world into believing they still play in a way that they haven't since 1982. That's why so many pundits seem baffled by Brazil's recent successes in the Confederations Cup and the Copa America. John Terry, having watched from the stands as they beat England 1-0 in Doha last year, was still talking about them having "individuals who can frighten anyone one-on-on" while insisting "I don't think Brazil are anything really to worry about".
Their individuals probably aren't, but individuality is no longer their strength; their strength is their cohesion, and the discipline of their pressing which, allied to their technique when in possession, means their opponents almost never have the ball, something Wayne Rooney pointed out in a post-match interview in which his bright red face paid eloquent testament to just how much fruitless chasing he had done.
Notably, Brazil's worst recent performance came in their 1-1 draw in World Cup qualifying away to Ecuador, when only a string of saves from Julio Cesar preserved them from heavy defeat; in Quito, of course, the altitude makes the physical effort required for hard pressing far more difficult.
Shock and awe
Even in the context of their own excellence, though, Barça were exceptional in that opening 20 minutes. Which raises the question of why then, why not every game, and why not in the final 70 minutes. Perhaps an element of complacency crept in, perhaps Arsenal slowly shook themselves out of their daze and began to play, perhaps the replacement of Arshavin with Emmanuel Eboué gave them a greater defensive presence on the right; certainly those seemed to be the commonest explanations.
It is, anyway, a historical truth that when sides strike a period when everything clicks perfectly as it did for Barça in that early period, it rarely lasts more than a few minutes, even in performances held up as the greatest of all time. West Germany, for instance, only really played brilliantly for the first 35 minutes of their 3-1 win over England at Wembley in 1972. Even Hungary, in their 6-3 demolition of England in 1953, were done after 65 minutes, and had dipped towards the end of the first half. Transcendence is, by definition, very difficult to achieve and even harder to maintain.
But it may also be that Barcelona's early surge was part of a calculated plan, and that is why the comparison with Lobanovskyi seems apt, even though the more direct line of influence is through Michels and Johan Cruyff. Pressing with the intensity Barcelona achieved on Wednesday is exhausting, and cannot be kept up for long periods.
In The Methodological Basis of the Development of Training Models, the book he co-wrote with Anatoliy Zelentsov, Lobanovskyi lays out three different kinds of pressing. There is full-pressing, when opponents are hounded deep in their own half; half-pressing, when opponents are closed down only as they cross halfway; and there is false pressing, when a team pretends to press, but doesn't – that is, one player would close down the man in possession, while the others would sit off.
Particularly against technically gifted opponents, Lobanovskyi would have his sides perform the full-press early to rattle them, after which false pressing would often be enough to induce a mistake – and often, of course, his side would be comfortably ahead after the period of full-pressing.
Whether Guardiola has quite such a structured theory is unlikely, but it does seem probable that there was a conscious effort from Barcelona to impose themselves early. The only problem was that, mainly through excellent goalkeeping, and partly through ill luck and poor finishing, Barça were not ahead after 20 minutes, and Arsenal, this season, as their catalogue of decisive late goals suggests, are rather more resilient than they used to be.
Pressing back
Arsenal's attempts to respond with pressing of their own were, frankly, dismal. Allowance should be made for how shaken they were in the early minutes, but the gulf between the sides was still obvious. For pressing to be effective the team must remain compact, which is why Rafael Benítez is so often to be seen on the touchline pushing his hands towards each other as though he were playing an invisible accordion. Arrigo Sacchi said the preferred distance from centre-forward to centre-back when out of possession was 25m, but the liberalisation of the offside trap (of which more next week) has made the calculation rather more complicated.
Again and again, Arsenal's forwards would press, and a huge gap would open up between that line and the line of the midfield. Or the midfield would press, and a gap would open in front of the back four. What that means is that the player in possession can simply step round the challenger into space, or play a simple pass to a player moving into the space; the purpose of the pressing is negated. Or, if you prefer, it was as though Arsenal were false-pressing, without having achieved the first stage of the hustle which is to persuade the opposition you are good at pressing.
Even worse followed after Arsène Wenger apparently attempted to address the issue at half-time, and encouraged his back four to push up. The problem, though, is that if the timing and organisation of the step-up are amiss, a side becomes vulnerable to simple balls over the top such as led to the first goal, or through-balls such as led to the second. This has been a recurring problem for Arsenal over the past couple of years, Gabriel Agbonlahor's goal for Aston Villa at the Emirates last season being a classic example.
The Walcott protocol
What turned the game towards Arsenal – although even in the final 25 minutes when they scored twice, it would be a stretch to say they took control – was the introduction of Theo Walcott. When England beat Croatia 4-1 in Zagreb 18 months ago, he was a key player not just because he scored a hat-trick, but because his pace hit at Croatia's attacking system on their left. At Euro 2008, they had got used to Ivan Rakitic cutting in on to his right foot, with the full-back Danijel Pranjic overlapping, but Pranjic, aware of the danger of allowing Walcott to get behind him, became inhibited. He was neutralised as an attacking threat, while Rakitic became predictable, always turning infield without anybody outside him to draw the full-back – which is the downside of the inside-out winger.
By the nature of how they play, Barcelona, similarly, are vulnerable in thefull-back areas. Dani Alves, in particular, is a sham of a defender – which is why Dunga prefers Maicon – but so long as Barcelona control possession it doesn't matter because his job is to be an extra man in midfield and to overlap for Messi (it may have been fear he would not be able to get forward as usual that led Guardiola to use Messi not on the right but as a false nine).
That is one of the reasons Barça's pressing is so awesome; with the full-backs pushed on, their system often appears as, effectively, a 2-5-3. To press with so many so high is a gamble, but one that has tended to be effective. Florent Malouda's performance against Alves in the second leg of the semi-final last year is an indication of what happens when the gamble fails and Barça do not control possession.
The arrival of Walcott disrupted Barça's pressing because Maxwell, like Pranjic, suddenly began looking over his shoulder (in a similar way, Charlie Davies's diagonal runs behind the full-back were a key to USA's victory over Spain at the Confederations Cup because they prevented Sergio Ramos pushing forward and so made Spain very narrow in midfield).
Samir Nasri had earlier had some success against Alves – almost all Arsenal's attacks in the first hour came through him, or through space he had created – and once Arsenal had weathered Barça's initial surge and begun to have some possession, it may be that Arshavin could have done something similar against Maxwell. Real pace, though, adds another dimension, because it means the full-back knows that as soon as the wide-man has got behind him, he has no chance of catching up. Perhaps that is an argument for Walcott starting, but then again, without Eboué last week, maybe they wouldn't have got any grip on possession.
And that, really, is the dilemma for Arsenal: attack Barcelona where they are vulnerable, by playing two out and out attacking wide-men, and the danger is you never have enough possession to make the most of that potential advantage. Concentrate on winning possession by playing more cautiously, and you may have no damaging way in which to use it.
The bigger problem, though, is the issue of pressing. Even if all else is equal, the fact remains that Barça are far, far more adept at winning the ball back than Arsenal, and that makes it all but certain they will dominate possession, and thus the game. Maslov and Lobanovskyi would have approved.
Jonathan Wilson is guardian.co.uk's east European football correspondent. He also writes regularly for the Independent, the Independent on Sunday, FourFourTwo magazine and anybody else who waves money in his direction. He has written two books - Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football and Inverting the Pyramid, a book on football tactics.
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